Chandrakirti's Seven Fold Reasoning

Meditation on the Selfness of Persons



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Contents

Introduction

One of the principal texts used in the study of Mādhyamika philosophy in Tibetan Buddhism is Chandrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra*, the *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way"*. Chandrakīrti represents the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika school as opposed to the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika school of Bhāvaviveka, Shantirakshita and so on. In the Gelukpa presentation of Sūtra and Tantra, Prāsaṅgika philosophy is the highest system, i.e., the correct system, of explaining the phenomena of the world and the way in which they exist. The viewpoint of the Prāsaṅgika system is thus the basis for practice in both the Vehicle of the Perfections and the Vehicle of the Secret Mantra, the one following Buddha's Sūtra teachings and the other following his Tantric teachings.

The main body of the *Supplement* is divided into 10 chapters, each chapter dealing with one of the 10 Bodhisattva stages. Each of these stages has a particular perfection associated with it. Thus, the first chapter deals with the actions and concerns of a Bodhisattva from the time he begins to practice, through his actual entry into the path of the Great Vehicle and up to and including his attainment of the first Bodhisattva ground and the perfection emphasized at that time, which is giving or generosity.

The sixth chapter describes the perfection of wisdom and is by far the longest in the *Supplement*, consisting of 226 verses. Forty-seven of those verses (verses 120 to 167) deal directly with the method of meditation which will be described here.

Because this paper is a somewhat more modest undertaking than that which would be required for a treatment of so large a portion of text, I intend to confine myself mainly to an explanation of Chandrakīrti's presentation of the Sevenfold Reasoning found in the *Clear Exposition of the Presentation of Tenets, a Beautiful Ornament for the Meru of the Subduer's Teaching* of Jang-kya (lcang-skya Hu-thog-thu Ye-shes-bstan-pa'i sgron-me; 1717-1786)[1] along with an explanation of the context of the Sevenfold Reasoning in Buddhist philosophy as a whole. The *Presentation of Tenets* is a moderately detailed, systematic exposition of the tenets of the Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical schools of India as they are preserved in Tibetan religious culture.

Jang-kya's presentation of the Sevenfold Reasoning is clear and

concise, as is the rest of his chapter on the system of the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika. He first outlines the sources of this form of reasoning in Sūtra and in Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Stanzas on the Middle Way Called "Wisdom"* (*Prajñānāma-Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*). Then he presents the Sevenfold Analysis as it is stated when the analogue of a chariot and its parts is used to exemplify a person and his aggregates. Having done that, he states the reasonings as they apply to a person. He closes with the explanation of the way in which a person, though completely without inherent existence, is still nominally existent.

Chapter One

The Place of Meditation on Emptiness in Buddhist Practice

It will be of benefit to establish the context within which the Sevenfold Reasoning functions, before going on to a description of it. This meditation is designed as a means of liberation from cyclic existence and, although it can be used as a basis for debate or philosophical dialectic, this is not the way in which it is supposed to function within the framework of Mādhyamika. It is noteworthy that Jang-kya feels called upon to comment on the proper role reasoning:[2]

> In particular, these statements of the many forms of reasonings which come to a conclusion about reality were made for the sake of clarifying the path to liberation for the fortunate. They were not made for the sake of those who are intent on debate.
>
> Buddhapālita's commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* says], "What purpose is there in teaching dependent-arising? I will explain. The Teacher whose nature is compassion [i.e., Nāgārjuna] saw that sentient beings are tormented by various sufferings. In order to liberate them from their sufferings he accepted the task of teaching the reality of phenomena just as they are. Therefore he began the teaching of dependent-arising."
>
> [Chandrakīrti's] *Supplement* says [VI:118ab]:[3] "[He] taught investigations in the *Treatise* [*on the Middle Way*] not out of attachment to disputation but for liberation; they are teachings of reality."
>
> The Great Being [Tsong-ka-pa] taught, "Every one of these investigations through reasoning which were set forth in the *Treatise on the Middle Way* were done so merely so that sentient beings might obtain emancipation."

Chandrakīrti says in the first verse of the first chapter of his *Supplement*:[4]

> Hearers and middling realizers of suchness are born from the Kings of Subduers [i.e., from Buddhas].

Buddhas are born from Bodhisattvas.
A compassionate mind, non-dual understanding and the altruistic mind of enlightenment are the causes of Sons of Conquerors [i.e., Bodhisattvas].

Buddhas are the cause of Hearers and Solitary Realizers because it is from Buddhas that they acquire the teachings, principally of dependent-arising, which enable them to attain their respective paths. Buddhas are born from Bodhisattvas because the Bodhisattva path leads to Buddhahood. What, then, are the causes of a Bodhisattva?

A compassionate mind is a mind that perceives sentient beings suffering and desires to spare them that suffering. This kind of mind can induce an altruistic mind of enlightenment, a mind that not only perceives sentient beings, suffering and pities them, but promises to bring about the end of that suffering through the attainment of highest enlightenment. The altruistic mind of enlightenment is the thought: "May I attain complete perfect Buddhahood, so that I will be able to rescue all sentient beings from the sufferings of cyclic existence."

A non-dual understanding is a wisdom consciousness that is free of the two extremes of permanence and annihilation. A wisdom consciousness is a discriminative mind; discriminative means that it can apply standards, such as the Sevenfold Reasoning, and select correct perceptions from incorrect perceptions. The view of the extreme of permanence is (1) the intellectually acquired idea that phenomena exist as they are perceived in normal perception, that is as concrete entities which are inherently there; and (2) the innate conception that phenomena exist in this way. Both of these are affirmative reactions to the false appearance itself of phenomena as concrete, inherently existent entities. The view of the extreme of nihilism is the idea that phenomena are without a mode of existence that they do possess; in Prāsaṅgika, although no phenomenon is inherently existent, all phenomena exist conventionally as nominalities or designations-all phenomena are dependent-arisings.

Chandrakīrti makes it clear that "non-dual" here means lacking the two extremes as explained above and does not mean cognizing the absence of the duality which is a difference of entity of subject and object.[5] Although a non-dual wisdom such as the latter is the goal of meditation on emptiness in the Chittamātra system of tenets and is a rough form of the wisdom which realizes

emptiness in Yogāchāra-Svātantrika Mādhyamika, there is no wisdom consciousness which realizes an emptiness of this kind of non-duality in Prāsaṅgika. Non-duality in this system either refers to the non-existence of the extremes of permanence and annihilation or to the non-*appearance* of a cognizing subject and its object during a direct perception of emptiness. Such a non-appearance does not entail non-existence.

It is necessary for a yogi to do some meditation and develop a compassionate mind before he can generate an altruistic mind of enlightenment. A mind of enlightenment is the desire to put into practice those things that will bring about the end of suffering for all migrating beings and, subsequent to that desire and its concomitant vow, the actual practice of the meditations and various modes of conduct that will result in the ability to do so.

Besides being a cause of the altruistic mind of enlightenment, compassion also paves the way for and sustains non-dual wisdom. The generation and development of non-dual wisdom is entailed in the practice of the sixth of the six perfections. The six perfections are among the practices which a Bodhisattva does in order to attain the ability to free sentient beings from their suffering. Thus, compassion provides the motivation for the practice of meditations that will bring about the wisdom which cognizes emptiness.

Furthermore, Chandrakīrti delineates three forms of compassion in his *Supplement* (1:3-4):[6] compassion which observes suffering sentient beings alone; compassion which observes phenomena; and compassion which observes the unapprehendable. The first kind of compassion has as its object all sentient beings. Its aspect is the wish to free all sentient beings from suffering. Aspect is a very broad term but here means the attitude taken by the mind towards its object or the mode of operation of the mind towards its object. Compassion observing sentient beings, in its strongest form, would be based on the understanding of the reasons behind migrators' sufferings and their powerless rebirth over and over again in cyclic existence. These reasons will be discussed later. Here it is only necessary to note that they involve understanding the mechanism of the conception of inherent existence but do not require that the yogi have had meditative experience of the emptiness of inherent existence.

The second kind of compassion outlined by Chandrakīrti, compassion which observes phenomena, has the same aspect as before but its object is different. Tsong-ka-pa, in his commentary on the

Supplement, the *Illumination of the Thought* (*Dgongs pa rab gsal*), comments:[7]

> The compassion which apprehends phenomena does not apprehend sentient beings alone; it apprehends sentient beings who disintegrate momentarily. Therefore, its objects are sentient beings qualified by momentary impermanence. When [a yogi] has certainty that sentient beings are disintegrating momentarily, he has refuted within his mind that there is a permanent, partless and independent sentient being. Due to that he can have certainty that there is no sentient being who is a different entity from [his mental and physical] aggregates.
>
> At this point he understands that sentient beings are imputed to merely the collection of their aggregates. Therefore, since his object comes to be sentient beings who are imputed merely to the phenomena of their aggregates and so forth, "[compassion] apprehending phenomena" is spoken of.
>
> Impermanent sentient beings are merely an illustration. "Observing phenomena" can refer also to the observation of sentient beings who are without existence as self-sufficient or substantial entities.

Chandrakīrti himself went no further than to say "migrators upon whom falls the suffering of impermanence in each and every moment."[8] Note, however, that Tsong-ka-pa merely says that it is from the realization of impermanence of sentient beings that the rest is entailed. The first entailment, that there is no permanent, partless and independent sentient being, is not one of the principal realizations in Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika; such a sentient being is a philosophical imposition rather than being a self of which there is an innate conception. (These terms will be discussed later.)

The conception of a self-sufficient or substantially existing person, however, does have an innate form. For Prāsaṅgikas it is the coarser form of the obstructions to liberation from cyclic existence. For the Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas and all other Buddhist tenet systems the negation of self-sufficient existence alone is enough to ensure liberation from cyclic existence; thus, for them the conception of self-sufficient or substantial existence is the subtle form of the obstructions to liberation.[9]

The third kind of compassion is that which observes the

unapprehendable. The unapprehendable, Chandrakirti explains, are emptinesses of inherent existence.[10] Therefore, the objects of this form of compassion are sentient beings qualified by emptiness or, as Tsong-ka-pa glosses it, by non-true existence.[11] (In Buddhist philosophy, 'non-true existence' means not truly existent nor empty of true existence; it is not some special kind of existence which is a subsistence of what does not exist.)

The important point here is that while all three types of compassion have the same aspect, the desire to liberate all sentient beings from the burden of their sufferings, the objects in the cases of the second and third varieties are qualified by modes of existence that require a degree of meditative investigation into reality. In order to be able to generate the third form of compassion it is necessary to have some experience with the production of non-dual wisdom.

It was explained above that for a yogi to generate an altruistic mind of enlightenment, and then put into action the practices necessary to attain a position where he would have the ability to aid sentient beings, involves the practice of the sixth perfection, that of wisdom. Even if the yogi is a practitioner of Tantra, he must generate a mind of enlightenment. In his *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* Tsong-Ka-pa says:[12]

> The Conqueror [Buddha] spoke of two Great Vehicles (Mahayana), the Great Vehicle of the Perfections and that of the Secret Mantra. There is no Great Vehicle apart from those. Into whichever one of these two you enter, the only portal is an altruistic mind of enlightenment. When you have produced that in your continuum, even were you to produce nothing else, you would still be called a person of the Great Vehicle. And when you lack it, no matter what good qualities you have, such as cognition of emptiness for instance, you will fall to the levels of the Hearers and their like.

Furthermore, without a non-dual wisdom which cognizes emptiness a yogi would be unable to practice correctly the stage of completion of the Highest Yoga class of Tantras and would thus be unable to accomplish the accumulation of wisdom which when fully developed becomes a Buddha's Truth Body. Ye-shay-gyel-tsen (Ye-shes-rgyal-mtshan), the tutor of the eighth Dalai Lama, says:[13]

> It is said that this profound view of the middle way [i.e., emptiness] is the life of both the Sūtra and Tantra paths; it is also said, particularly with respect to Highest Secret Mantra [i.e., the Highest Yoga Tantra], that there is no chance of having an actual path of Mantra without this view.

Thus both non-dual wisdom and an altruistic mind of enlightenment are necessary even in Tantra.

There are many other ways of explaining the relationship between meditation on emptiness, meditating compassion and the generation of the mind of enlightenment. For instance, Tsong-ka-pa in his *Three Principal Aspects of the Path* presents the generation of an altruistic mind of enlightenment and meditation on emptiness as the second and third members of the triad of principal practices. Compassion he does not explicitly treat but it may be inferred, as does his commentator Lo-sang-bel-den-den-bay-nyi-ma (Blo-bzang-dpal-ldan-bstan-pa'i-nyi-ma, the fourth Panchen Lama), that it is a precursor to the attainment of a mind of enlightenment. In his commentary, the generation of a mind of enlightenment is explained following the sevenfold precepts of cause and effect of the Indian Buddhist philosopher and yogi of the 11th century A.D., Atīsha.[14] In Atīsha's system the fifth step in the generation of an altruistic mind of enlightenment is that of great compassion. The remaining aspect of the three aspects enumerated by Tsong-ka-pa is renunciation. It is a prelude to both of the other two.

Tsong-ka-pa says in his *Three Principal Aspects of the Path*:[15]

> If you do not have the wisdom
> Which cognizes the way things are,
> Even if you have cultivated renunciation
> And an altruistic mind of enlightenment,
> You cannot sever the root of cyclic existence.
> Therefore, make effort in the means
> Of realizing dependent arising.

Āryadeva says:[16]

> When selflessness is seen in objects,
> The seeds of cyclic existence are destroyed.

Thus the yogi must practice meditations which develop his non-dual wisdom. If he has generated an altruistic mind of enlightenment but balks at meditating on emptiness, then his dedication of

himself to relieve all sentient beings of their sufferings is merely words. If he cannot liberate himself from cyclic existence, how can he have the ability to liberate countless numbers of sentient beings?

This has been a broad overview of the manner in which meditation on emptiness fits into the philosophy and practices of a Buddhist yogi according to Chandrakīrti and other Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika philosophers. Let us now narrow our focus and examine the way in which a yogi would begin to meditate on the emptiness of true existence of persons, using the Sevenfold Reasoning. It will be helpful to discuss first the structural framework which explains the manner in which phenomena and, in particular, persons are conceived to exist inherently.

Chapter Two

The Object of Negation: The Conception of a Self

Chandrakīrti introduces his presentation of the Sevenfold Reasoning with the following verse [VI: 120]:[17]

> [A yogi] sees in his mind that the afflictions and the faults
> Arise from the false view of a transitory collection.
> Having understood that the object of this is self,
> He negates self.

Tsong-ka-pa in his commentary on the *Supplement*, the *Illumination of the Thought*, comments:[18]

> A yogi, desiring to engage in reality, desiring to remove all the faults which are the afflictions, now analyzes, thinking; "What is the root of this wandering in cyclic existence?" When he has analyzed thus he will see in his mind that the afflictions of desire [hatred, confusion and so on] and the faults of birth, aging, sickness and death arise without exception from the false view of a transitory collection. The false view of a transitory collection is an afflicted knowledge in the form of the thoughts 'I' and 'mine', conceiving these two to be inherently existent. [The afflictions and the faults] are results of the false view of a transitory collection.

The thrust of this passage is that the sufferings of cyclic existence and the afflictions through whose activity more suffering is induced are the results of the false view of a transitory collection. If this can be destroyed, then the yogi can attain liberation from cyclic existence. What then is the false view of a transitory collection and what is wrong with it—why does it inevitably lead to suffering and the afflictions? In order to explain this, it is first necessary to explain a little about self. Chandrakīrti said:[19]

> Having understood that the object of this is self, the yogi negates self.

'Self' in the first line means the nominally existent person, the so-called 'mere-I'. This self is a phenomenon that exists conventionally. It is the object of observation of the false view of a transitory

collection. The false view of a transitory collection errs in conceiving this mere-I to be an inherently existent I, or inherently existent person. This inherently existent person is the self in the second line of the above quotation. It does not exist either ultimately or conventionally and it is the object to be negated when the yogi meditates on the emptiness of a person. The emptiness of a person is a person's lack of inherent existence.

That the self which is the object of observation of the false view of a transitory collection is existent and is not an object to be negated is made clear by Tsong-ka-pa:[20]

> At that time [a yogi] desiring to destroy all faults should destroy their root, the false view of a transitory collection. These will be destroyed, moreover, through understanding the non-existence of a self, that is [the non-existence of] a natural existence of the self which is the object of that [false view of a transitory collection].

Thus, it is important to know that self in Buddhism has two disparate meanings. In some instances it means inherent existence, natural existence or self-sufficient existence—none of which are existent in any way whatsoever, even conventionally. They are completely incorrect. Chandrakīrti, in his *Commentary on (Āryadeva's) "Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of a Bodhisattva"*, defines the term:[21]

> Here, 'self' is an inherence or nature of phenomena, i.e., a non-dependence on anything else. The non-existence of this [inherence] is selflessness.

Jang-kya glosses this as meaning that the mode of innate conception of self is that the phenomenon to which a self is falsely attributed is conceived to exist objectively through its own nature without being posited there by the power of thought. His definition of this sense of self, therefore, is objective existence, i.e., existence in the object through its own nature. This kind of conception of existence carries with it the feeling of an independence of the object from the subject, a feeling of an object which is not merely imputed there by thought. Examples of such a usage of 'self' are the terms conception of a self' and 'selflessness'.

At other times, 'self' can mean the person or I. As these terms are technically used in Prāsaṅgika philosophy they refer to the conventionally existent person which does have existence as a mere

nominality imputed to the collection of the five mental and physical aggregates. Such a self cannot be found when searched for with an ultimate analysis and thus has no ultimate existence, as is the case with any phenomenon in the Prāsaṅgika system. Ultimate analysis is a search to find a phenomenon which really exists in the way in which the world conceives it to exist. Therefore, this nominally existent self, although it is existent, is not existent in any way that corresponds to the normal perceptions of the world. Examples of such a usage of 'self' are 'self which accumulates actions' and 'emptiness of inherent existence of a self'.

Here is a brief summary of the different meanings of self and related terms. (♦ indicates a reconstruction of the Sanskrit from the Tibetan.)

I	self *ātman* *bdag*	=	person *pudgala* (Sanskrit) *gang-zag* (Tibetan)
			I *aham* *nga*
			mere-I *aham-mātra* ♦ *nga-tsam*
II[22]	self *ātman* *bdag*	=	inherent existence *svabhāva-siddhi* *rang-bzhin-gyis-grub-pa*
			natural existence *svalakshana-siddhi* *rang-gi-mtshan-nyid-kyis-grub-pa*
			true existence *bhāva, vastu/satya-siddhi* ♦ *dngos-po/bden-par-grub-pa*
			objective existence / existence in the object *vishaya-siddhi* ♦ *yui-steng-nas-grub-pa/yul-steng-du-grub-pa*

			ultimate existence *paramārtha-siddhi* ♦ *don-dam-par-grub-pa*
			existence by way of its own entity *svabhāvatā-siddhi* ♦ *rang-gi-ngo-bo-nyid-kyis-grub-pa*
III	self *ātman* *bdag*	 = 	existence as a self-sufficient or substantial entity ? *rang-rkya-thub-pa'i-rdzas-su-yod-pa*
IV	self *ātman* *bdag*	 = 	permanent, partless and independent self *shāshyataika-svātantrika-ātman* ♦ *rtag-gcig-rang-dbang-can-gyi-bdag*
V[23]	mine *ātmīya* *bdag-gi-ba*	 = 	mine *mama* *nga-yi-ba*
			mine *ātmanīna* *bdag-gi*
VI	conception of a self *ātma-grāha* *bdag-tu-'dzin-pa* */bdag-'dzin*	=	conception of true existence *satya-siddha-grāha* ♦ *bden-par-grub-par-'dzin-pa* */bden-'dzin*
			conception of inherent existence *svabhāva-siddha-grāha* ♦ *rang-bzhin-gyis-grub-par-'dzin-pa* etc.
VII	conception of a self *ātma-grāha* *bdag-tu-'dzin-pa*	=	conception of an I *ahamkāra* *ngar-'dzin-pa*[24]

VIII	conception of mine *ātmīya-grāha* = *bdag-gir-'dzin-pa* /*bdag-gi-bar-'dzin-pa*	conception of mine *mamakāra* *nga-yir-'dzin-pa*

The terms within each group in the right-hand column are mutually inclusive of each other. For example, person, I and mere-I are equivalents. The terms in the left-hand column, on the other hand, are broader than their 'synonyms' on the right: every instance of existence as a self-sufficient or substantial entity is an instance of self, but every instance of self is not an instance of existence as a self-sufficient or substantial entity.

The type I self, the mere-I, is the person as it actually is and as it should be apprehended. This self is a conventionally existent I which is imputed to the five aggregates which are its particular bases of imputation. It is the so-called "base which is empty", the foundation of the negation of inherent existence; inherent existence itself is the object of negation.

Tsong-ka-pa explains the position of this self in the context of meditation on emptiness as follows:[25]

> In the beginning the yogi analyzes only the self:
> "Is this so-called self which is the object of the conception of a self existent by way of its own entity or not?"
> A yogi, through negating the self which is inherent existence, destroys the false view of a transitory collection. This done he has turned away from all faults.

Self in the term 'conception of a self' is an incorrectly imposed mode of existence which does not exist in reality. The self which is the observed object of the conception of a self, however, is an existent phenomenon. This latter self is technically the basis of analysis in meditation on emptiness. The analysis of which it is the basis is an inquiry into whether or not the existent self does or does not exist as an inherently existent phenomenon, that is, as a self of the former type (type II in the table). The type II self, inherent existence, is not the basis of analysis because if it were the yogi would be analyzing whether inherent existence inherently exists or not.

The mere-I is an existent phenomenon. The selves of types II (inherent existence), III (self-sufficiency), and IV (permanent, partless independence) are not. They are classified not as phenomena but as non-existent imaginaries. 'Mere' in the term 'mere-I' eliminates the false imposition of a type II, III or IV self as the mode of existence of this I. The mere-I is an I qualified as being non-inherently existent.

The type II self, inherent existence, is the referent object of a subtle conception of a self in the Prāsaṅgika system. A subtle conception of a self is so named because it is a strong conception which is difficult to remove. It conceives a person, for instance—its object of observation—to be inherently existent; the inherently existent person is its referent object. An object of observation is nominally existent. The referent object of a false conception of a self has no existence whatsoever.

The type III self (self-sufficient or substantial existence) is the referent object of a coarse conception of a self of persons in Prāsaṅgika. Conceiving a person to be a self-sufficient or substantial entity is conceiving it as having a different character from the aggregates which are its bases of imputation. It is seen as in control of and not dependent on the aggregates.

The example used is that of a head salesman and the other salesmen who are under him. Just as the head salesman and his subordinates are all salesmen, so a self-sufficient or substantially existent self is not innately conceived to be a different entity from its aggregates. Such a conception of difference of entity is only intellectually acquired.[26] A self-sufficient or substantially existent self is a self that is substantially existent, which is to say, self-sufficient; the 'or' shows a qualifying apposition.

The type IV self (permanent, partless and independent) is the referent object of the coarsest conception of a self of persons in the Prāsaṅgika system. It corresponds to the self as postulated by non-Buddhist systems such as Vedānta.

The mine, type V in the table, can be divided into two varieties. The mine which are of the subject's own continuum are the objects of observation of the false view of a transitory collection which conceives mine. The mine of the continuums of persons other than the subject are objects of observation of the conception of a self of phenomena external to the continuum of the subject. The latter mine does not have the importance of the former, nor is it as central a subject of discussion in the literature of emptiness as is

the former. For the false view of a transitory collection is the principal fetter obstructing liberation from cyclic existence.

The nature of the mine is a subject of much controversy. Chandrakīrti, in his *Clear Words* (a commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Text Called "Wisdom"*), and Tsong-ka-pa, in his *Ocean of Reasoning* (a commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Text Called "Wisdom"* following Chandrakīrti's commentary), define mine as the phenomena of the subject's own five aggregates. Chandrakīrti says:[27]

> That which pertains to the self is the mine; the term refers to one's own five aggregates.
>
> The [conventionally existent] self is the object of the conception of an I. The mine, the aggregates and so on, are the objects of the conception of mine. Due to the pacification, i.e., the non-arising or non-observation, of the true existence [of the I and mine] the yogi annihilates the conception of an I and the conception of mine.

Tsong-ka-pa says, commenting on the same verse [XVIII: 2cd]:[28]

> ...[because of] the pacification of the true existence of the self, i.e., the person who is the object of the conception of an I, and of the true existence of mine, i.e., the aggregates which are the objects of the conception of mine...

Nga-wang-ben-den (Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan), in his *Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's ['Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa]) "Great Exposition of Tenets"*, adduces many more examples of this definition of mine from the *Clear Words*, the *Supplement*, Chandrakīrti's *Autocommentary on the Supplement* and Tsong-ka-pa's commentaries on both the *Fundamental Text Called "Wisdom"* and the *Supplement*.[29]

Many of these quotations treat mine only tangentially. Many, for example, do not have as their main topic the I and mine themselves, but rather the destruction of the false view of a transitory collection, or the relationship between the cognition of the emptiness of true existence of an I and the cognition of the emptiness of true existence of mine. In at least two places, however, Tsong-ka-pa gives explicit explanations of mine. In his *Illumination of the Thought* he says:[30]

> The object of apprehension of an innate false view of a transitory collection which conceives mine is just mine: do not hold that one's own eyes and so forth are its object.

> The aspect [of the innate false view of a transitory collection] is the observation of that object and the conception that the mine is naturally existent.
>
> Now [a qualm might arise as follows]: [Chandrakīrti, in his] *Autocommentary* to [the line of the *Supplement* beginning] "'This is mine'" [I: 3b][31], says: "This is the apprehension of any phenomenon other than the object of the conception of an I; [this apprehension] thinks 'This is mine'". Apprehending a base such as an eye, there is the conception, "This is mine." This conception is explained to be the conception of mine. How is this so?
>
> The meaning of this is that having seen an eye, for example, to be mine, there is a conception that this mine is truly existent. However, this is not a teaching that [something which is] an example of mine is an object [of the conception of mine].

The crucial phrase here is "Having seen an eye, for example, to be mine." Tsong-ka-pa is saying that an eye, while it is a base which can be characterized as being mine, is not always characterized as being mine. This accords with the oral tradition explanation of the false view of a transitory collection which conceives mine. This explanation may be paraphrased as follows:[32]

> First [the subject] observes [his own] I and conceives it to be naturally existent. Then, observing the eyes, ears and so forth, he generates the thought 'mine'. Observing that mine, he conceives it to be naturally existent. This is the false view of a transitory collection which conceives mine.
>
> However, all instances of the false view of a transitory collection are necessarily instances of the conception of a self of persons. This is because the import of the apprehension of mine is apprehension of an I, since the apprehension of mine must be associated with the apprehension of an I.

Tsong-ka-pa explains in his *Ocean of Reasoning*:[33]

> The [conventionally existent] I is the base which generates the thought 'I'. There is a consciousness observing it which as its aspect conceives [the conventionally existent I] to exist naturally. This is both an innate false view of a transitory

> collection which conceives of an I and a consciousness which is ignorant with respect to a self of persons.
>
> There is a consciousness observing the [conventionally existent] mine which as its aspect conceives [the conventionally existent mine] to exist naturally. This is both an innate consciousness which is a false view of a transitory collection conceiving mine and a consciousness which is ignorant with respect to the mine of a person.
>
> The consciousness which observes the bases of mine, the eyes and so forth, and conceives them in this way [i.e., as naturally existent] is a conception of a self of phenomena other than persons. Therefore, the apprehension of mine is not an apprehension of those [phenomena].

Jam-yang-shay-ba uses the first two paragraphs of this passage as support for his assertion of a mine which is a person who makes his mental and physical aggregates into possessions.[34] The aggregates, exemplified as "the eyes and so forth", are the bases of designation of the mine imputed to them. This mine is not a different entity from the person; it is the person considered from a different point of view—as the maker into mine or the possessor.

Jam-yang-shay-ba's commentator, Nga-wang-ben-den, quotes the final paragraph of the passage from Tsong-ka-pa's *Ocean of Reasoning* in support of his assertion that mine refers to the phenomena of the subject's own continuum, his aggregates, his former and future lives and so on. For him, the "consciousness which observes the bases of mine" and is a conception of a self of phenomena other than persons is an apprehender of the eyes and so forth of any continuum. Rather than asserting that a mine is necessarily a person as Jam-yang-shay-ba does, he merely restricts the spectrum of suitable objects to those of the subject's own continuum.[35]

These views fall into either the theory that mine are phenomena specified or qualified as the possessions of a person or the theory that mine is the entity which does the specifying. Another view is the assertion of Jay-tsun-pa (Rje-btsun-pa), the textbook writer for the Je (Byes) college of Sera monastery, that mine is a third category apart from both persons and phenomena other than persons.[36]

The two conceptions of a self—types VI, VII in the table—and the conception of mine (type VIII) are mental consciousnesses which are mistaken about the actual mode of existence of persons and other phenomena. They conceive what is not inherently existent to

be inherently existent. There are, however, conceptions of I and mine which *are* not misconceptions. These are the correct conceptions of I and mine and are sometimes called by the same names as those motivated by ignorance.

In normal perception these valid cognitions are invariably found mixed with the after-effects of ignorance which cause objects to appear as if inherently existent. This is one of the unique features of Tsong-ka-pa's presentation of Mādhyamika; he seeks to preserve the valid cognition of conventional phenomena. It should be kept in mind, however, that valid cognition of phenomena in ordinary worldly perception does not produce knowledge about their actual mode of existence.

Therefore, since our concern here is with the mechanism of the incorrect conception of reality and the means to correct that misconception, when these terms are used here they will refer to these false conceptions.

The English term 'conception of a self' is actually only an approximation of bdag-tu-'dzin-pa (Skt.: ātmagrāha). A 'conception of a self' is more strictly a conceiver of a self; it is a mental consciousness whose function is to conceive a self. 'Conception' in the strict sense of the word is the process in which a phenomenon is conceived. Moreover, a conception of inherent existence may be broken into four parts, only one of which is the conceiver. The other three parts are the so-called objects of the conception: the object of observation, the referent object and the appearing object.

It has already been explained that the referent object of a conception of inherent existence is an inherently existent phenomenon and that this referent object does not exist. An inherently existent phenomenon seems to exist because an image of it appears to a conceiver of inherent existence. Although this appearing object seems to have its locus in the external world, it is an internal generic image. It exists itself, but the object to which it refers, an inherently existent phenomenon, has no existence. The object of observation is a conventionally existent phenomenon. It is not known by a conceiver of inherent existence except in the sense that the referent object corresponds to this phenomenon in so far as it is imagined to be inherently existent.

The type VI conception of a self—the conception of true existence— is the conception of either persons or phenomena other than persons as having a mode of existence that they do not have in reality. 'Self' here means a self of type II, III or IV. This self is the

referent object of the type VI conception of a self. Its objects of observation are the type I self—the mere-I—and conventionally existent phenomena.

The type VII conception of a self, the conception of an I, has two varieties. The conception of a self of the person which is of the subject's own continuum is the false view of a transitory collection which conceives of an I. The conception of a self of persons who are of continuums other than the subject's continuum is not a part of the false view of a transitory collection. The type VII conception of a self is usually called the conception of an I. 'Conception of a self' almost always refers to that of type VI in the table, the conception of true existence. Furthermore, the term 'conception of an I' almost always refers to the conception of an I which is one of the two types of the false view of a transitory collection.

The conception of mine (type VIII in the table) has two divisions in exactly the same manner as the conception of an I. In the same way, the term 'conception of mine' usually refers to the conception of mine which are of the subject's own continuum.

The false view of a transitory collection corresponds to the conceptions of I and mine, with the proviso that these are the subject's own I and mine. The 'I' in the term 'conception of an I' is the mere-I discussed previously. The false view of a transitory collection takes the mere-I of that same person's continuum and conceives it to be a truly existent I. Likewise, it takes the phenomena of that same person's continuum, the parts of the body, consciousnesses, mental factors and so on, which have been qualified or specified as mine, and conceives them to be truly existent mine. Or, following the other view, it takes the mine which is the possessor of these phenomena and conceives it to be a truly existent mine. The mere-I and the mine are the objects of observation of the false view of a transitory collection. The truly existent person and the truly existent mine are its referent objects.

'False view of a transitory collection' translates the Tibetan term 'jig-tshogs-la-lta-ba which is in turn a translation of the Sanskrit original satkāyadṛṣhṭi. The Tibetan literally reads "view of what is a collection and is disintegrating". Satkāya comes from the verbal sad which is from the root sad, to perish, plus kāya, corpus, collection.[37] The sat is not from the verbal root as (to be) which has sat as its present participle, meaning being or existent. Contemporary Sanskritists, however, appear to build the word from the sat of as.[38]

The 'disintegrating collection' is the collection of mental and

physical aggregates. If the object of observation of the false view of a transitory collection is the mere-I, why is it called view of the aggregates?

Nāgārjuna says in his *Precious Garland of Advice for the King*:[39]

> As long as a conception of the aggregates exists,
> So long therefore does a conception of I exist.
> Further, when the conception of I exists,
> There is action; from that further there is birth.

Again, from that same text:[40]

> Just as without depending on a mirror
> An image of one's face
> Is not seen, so also [there is no] I
> Which does not depend on the aggregates.

Although the actual object of a false view of a transitory collection is the mere-I, this object will not appear unless the aggregates appear first. The mere-I, as mentioned previously, exists as an imputation to the five aggregates. If the five aggregates do not appear, then neither can it. Moreover, unless the five aggregates are conceived to exist truly the false view of a transitory collection does not come into being. Thus, Tsong-ka-pa explains that a conception of a self of phenomena other than persons is a cause of the conception of I and mine.[41]

Since, as was seen above, the false view of a transitory collection is the root of cyclic existence, how is it proper for it to have a cause itself? Would not this cause then be the root of cyclic existence? Tsong-ka-pa's answer is that although the conception of a self of phenomena other than persons and the false view of a transitory collection have different objects, the way in which they conceive these objects to be truly existent is the same.[42] It is not the object of observation but rather the conception itself that is the causal factor in bringing about rebirth and suffering.

The modes of existence of persons and of other phenomena are asserted to be exactly the same. A person is any sentient being: the yogi himself, other human beings, animals, bugs and so on. Phenomena, as the term is used in the expression 'conception of a self of phenomena', includes all phenomena which are not persons: plants, rocks, houses, chariots, space, emptinesses and all instances of the five mental and physical aggregates save one. (The exception is the person, the mere-I, which is considered to be an

aggregate in the division of compositional factors. Generally speaking, all impermanent phenomena in the universe are included within the five aggregates.)

Therefore, in Prāsaṅgika, both persons and all other phenomena are empty of inherent existence. Persons, however, also lack existence as self-sufficient or substantial entities and as permanent, partless and independent selves. Phenomena other than persons are not meditated upon as being empty of these modes of existence, for the simple reason that there is no innate conception of either of these two in phenomena other than persons. Indeed, in Prāsaṅgika, there is no innate conception of persons' existence as permanent, partless and independent.

The following tables will clarify the relationship between the various modes of the conception of a self.

Table A






TABLE B



* *The subtle conception of a self of persons conceives its object to be inherently existent.*

TABLE C



(The innate conception of an I, the innate conception of mine and the innate conception of a self of internal phenomena are the principal fetters which bind a sentient being in cyclic existence.)

These tables follow Jang-kya's system of explaining the different modes of conception of a self. There is debate on some aspects of

this. Jay-tsun-pa, for instance, makes an initial threefold division: in addition to a conception of a self of persons and a conception of a self of phenomena other than persons there is a conception of a self of mine.[43]

Jam-yang-shay-ba ('Jam-dbyang-bzhad-pa), the textbook writer for the Go-mang (sgo-mang) college of Dre-bung monastery, argues that mine is not what is possessed but is the possessor. Thus, the object of the conception of mine is a type of person; this type of person is the same entity as the person who is the object of the conception of an I.[44]

Note that in the above charts all the modes of the conception of a self except one have two forms: innate and artificial. The explanation of the false view of a transitory collection has been of its innate form. The innate conception of a self is an habitual affirmation of the way in which phenomena appear. In Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika, phenomena are not just conceived to exist truly, they also appear to do so.

The obstructions which must be overcome in order to attain Buddhahood are divided into two types: the obstructions of the afflictions, or obstructions to liberation, and the obstructions to omniscience. The obstructions to liberation are the conceptions of a self of both persons and phenomena. The obstructions to omniscience are mainly the predispositions established by the conception of true existence which cause phenomena to appear from their own side as if they were truly existent. In Prāsaṅgika the error involved in the conception of a self is not merely a gratuitous error on the part of the perceiving subject; it is a mistake made in response to the way in which the object appears due to the subject's previous conditioning.

Artificial conceptions of a self are based on intellectually acquired theories about the nature of phenomena. The conception of a person as a permanent, partless and independent being is an artificial conception that might rise, for example, from the study of Vedānta. Artificial conceptions of a self are not limited to philosophers, however. They may masquerade as common sense; common sense is usually nothing more than culturally acquired values which only seem to be universal.

An example of an artificial form of the false view of a transitory collection is the conception of an inherently existent person who has no relationship with his mental and physical aggregates. The false view of a transitory collection, whether it be innate or

artificial, cannot apprehend its object, the mere-I or the mine, without the prior appearance of the aggregates. The innate form affirms this appearance and conceives of a self or mine which is associated in some way with the aggregates. Jang-kya states it succinctly:[45]

> [This is] the way in which an innate conceiver of true existence conceives the person to be naturally existent in the aggregates. It does not conceive [the person thus] after having analyzed whether [the person] is the same as or different from [the aggregates]. It conceives [the person thus] through the power of ordinary habituation without any reason at all. The mode of conception which [conceives them to be] one [entity] or different [entities] does not exist in an innate mind.

It should be noted that in Tsong-ka-pa's system of explaining the operation of the mind, an innate mind is not necessarily a mind which conceives a self. There is an innate mind which is a valid cognizer and is often present in correct perception but is not valid with respect to the mode of existence of phenomena. It therefore is not a correct perception which can act as direct aid to liberation from cyclic existence.

It was explained above that in Prāsaṅgika both persons and other phenomena are conceived to exist in the same way by the innate conception of a self. It was also explained that, despite the fact that the conception of a self of the aggregates must take place prior to the false view of a transitory collection, there is only one root of cyclic existence, this being so because the mode of conception is the causal factor and not the object observed. When it comes to practice, however, a yogi begins his meditation on emptiness with meditations on the emptiness of a self of persons. Tsong-kapa says, in the *Essence of the Good Explanations*:[46]

> The conception of a person, the observation of which generates the thought 'I', and the conception of the phenomena of his continuum as the two selves are the principal fetters [which bind one to cyclic existence]. Therefore, these two conceptions are the principal bases which are negated through reasoning.

This establishes that the chief obstacles to be overcome are the conception of a self of persons, in particular the conception of an I, and

the conception of a self of the internal phenomena, those which belong to the subject's own continuum. The former is part of the false view of a transitory collection. The latter is the inducer of the false view of a transitory collection.[47] Or, interpreted in a different way, the latter is the false view of a transitory collection which conceives mine.

It is impossible to say that the false view of a transitory collection or the even broader conception of a self of persons is the only obstruction to be removed. Since the conception of a self of the aggregates *is* a part of the conception of a self of phenomena, rebirth and suffering cannot be halted without meditation on the emptiness of phenomena also. Chandrakīrti says in his *Commentary to the Supplement*:[48]

> When worldly conventionalities are analysed thus [i.e., through a Sevenfold Analysis] they do not exist. They do, however, exist through non-analytical renown. Therefore a yogi, when he analyzes [the chariot and the person] through this series [of reasons] will penetrate the depths of reality very quickly.

Jang-kya also indicates that the Sevenfold Reasoning is an easy means of realizing emptiness.[49]

Chapter Three

THE ACTUAL MEDITATION: THE SEVENFOLD REASONING

The first point in the *Supplement* at which the Sevenfold Reasoning is given in full is at VI:151. Chandrakīrti says:[50]

> In order to clarify what has been explained for the sake of establishing that the self [i.e., the person] is merely an imputation, I will show and explain an example external [to the person]:
>
> A chariot is neither asserted to be other than its parts
> Nor non-other; it is not asserted to possess them.
> It is not in the parts nor are the parts in it.
> It is not the mere collection [of the parts] nor is it [their] shape.
> Just so [should a yogi understand a person and its aggregates].

Chandrakīrti shows that if a yogi examines the bases of the designation 'chariot', i.e., the wheels, axle, body and so forth that give rise to the designation 'chariot', he will be unable to find any chariot there. The only chariot that does exist is the imputed chariot itself.

Here, in brief, are the seven aspects of the Sevenfold Analysis:[51]

1. There is no chariot which is other than its parts,
2. There is no chariot which is the same as its parts,
3. There is no chariot which inherently possesses its parts,
4. There is no chariot which inherently depends on its parts,
5. There is no chariot upon which its parts are inherently dependent,
6. There is no chariot which is the mere collection of its parts,
7. There is no chariot which is the shape of its parts.

Likewise, there is no self, i.e., person, who can be found among or separate from his or her bases of designation, the mental and physical aggregates of his or her own continuum, when that person is searched for by means of the Sevenfold Reasoning.

Technically the phenomenon imputed—the person—and the

bases of imputation—the aggregates—are conventionally existent. This, indeed, is why a yogi must be careful not to negate too much and fall into an extreme of nihilism. However, it is said that only a yogi who has had some experience with the cognition of emptiness can have an idea of this conventional existence which isn't based completely on ideas about inherent existence. Every perception that the beginning stage yogi has is colored with the appearance of inherent existence. There is no way for him at that point to break away from his habitual affirmation of that appearance.

The Sevenfold Reasoning is an analysis of the mode of existence of the person from the point of view of their relationship with the aggregates of their own continuum. It appears to have grown out of several progressively more extensive analyses based on this same context.

Buddha spoke in Sūtra of 20 false views of a transitory collection on the paradigm of the aggregate of form and the self:[52]

> Form is not the self;
> The self does not possess form;
> In form there is no self;
> In the self there is no form.

Likewise with each of the other aggregates: feelings are not the self, etc. These are given negatively; they are illustrations of an analysis of false views of a transitory collection and not of the conceptions themselves.

According to Tsong-ka-pa the 20 false views of a transitory collection are:[53]

> The view that forms, which are not the self, are the self; the view that the self, which does not naturally possess forms, does [naturally possess forms]; the views that the inherent existence of the self in forms and of forms in the self are the case when they are not. [These same modes of viewing apply to the other four aggregates.]

Not all of these 20 conceptions are considered by Prāsaṅgika philosophers to be actual false views of a transitory collection because they either have the same object of observation as the false view of a transitory collection or they have an object of observation which is a phenomenon associated with the self. The aggregate of forms, for example, is one of the bases of imputation of a self.[54]

Moreover, a consciousness which innately conceives of a self

does not analyze whether its object of observation is the same as or different from the bases of imputation of that object.[55] Chandrakīrti explains that "there is no [innate] apprehension [of a self] separate from the aggregates."[56] Thus, the false view of a transitory collection must be preceded by observation of the aggregates which are the bases of imputation of the person who is its object. This person is not considered to be either the same as or different from the aggregates. Conceiving their sameness or difference is a function of the artificial conceptions of a self.

Despite the fact that the fourfold analysis embodied in the 20 false views of a transitory collection is based on sameness, as in the first, and difference, as in the other three facets, it is applicable to the innate, non-analytical form of the false view of a transitory collection. For, if a self exists the way that it is conceived to exist by the innate conception of true existence, when analyzed it must exist either as the same entity as its bases of imputation or as a different entity from them.[57] These two positions cover all possibilities.

Nāgārjuna, in the 22nd chapter of his *Fundamental Text Called "Wisdom"*, adds one more position to the above four:[58]

> The Tathāgata is not the aggregates; nor is he other than the aggregates.
> The aggregates are not in him nor is he in them.
> The Tathāgata does not possess the aggregates.
> What Tathāgata is there?

As explained above, the conception of a self as a different entity from the aggregates which are its bases of imputation is only artificial. In particular, this new position of unrelated difference is said not to arise except in the non-Buddhist philosophical systems.[59]

Chandrakīrti expands the fivefold reasoning to seven with the addition of refutations of the positions that a self is the mere collection of the aggregates which are its bases of imputation or is the shape of the form aggregates. The position that the self is not the mere collection of the aggregates is a refutation of the position held by the Svātantrikas and others that the mental consciousness, i.e., the continuum, or collection of moments of the mental consciousness, is the self which takes rebirth. The position that the self is not the shape of the form aggregates is said by both Jang-kya and Jam-yang-shay-ba to be a refutation of a position held by other Buddhist tenet systems.[60]

The Sevenfold Reasoning has nine essentials, or stages, in its

practice. The first two must be done before the others, but the remaining seven may be done in any order that seems appropriate. In brief they are:

1. The essential of ascertaining the object to be negated,
2. The essential of ascertaining the pervasion,
3. The essential of realizing that the phenomenon imputed is not the same as its bases of imputation,
4. The essential of realizing that the phenomenon imputed is not different from its bases of imputation,
5. The essential of realizing that the phenomenon imputed is not dependent on its bases of imputation,
6. The essential of realizing that the phenomenon imputed is not the support upon which its bases of imputation are dependent,
7. The essential of realizing that the phenomenon imputed does not possess its bases of imputation,
8. The essential of realizing that the phenomenon imputed is not the mere collection of its bases of imputation,
9. The essential of realizing that the phenomenon imputed is not the shape of its bases of imputation.

There is an implicit 10th essential which follows from the practice of the other nine, that of realizing the non-inherent existence of the phenomenon imputed. In the case of the conventionally existent self, or mere-I, and the aggregates of its own continuum, the mere-I is the phenomenon imputed and the aggregates are its bases of imputation. In the case of the example which illustrates the Sevenfold Reasoning, the chariot is the phenomenon imputed and its parts are the bases of imputation.

1. The Essential of Ascertaining the Object to be Negated

The Sevenfold Reasoning is an ultimate analysis. An ultimate analysis is of the reality of phenomena, the way they actually exist. The crux of any ultimate analysis is that phenomena appear to exist inherently but in reality do not. Thus, when phenomena are searched for with a mind which applies strict criteria of eligibility for this kind of existence, they cannot be found. What is being sought in ultimate analysis is a way for a phenomenon to exist inherently through meeting the criteria which are being set for it. These criteria are not intricate and difficult to understand logical traps; on the whole, they involve merely the application of simple standards of logical consistency.

In order to search for an inherently existent phenomenon, it is necessary for a yogi to know what he is searching for. It is said that everything that is seen in normal perception both appears to the subject to be inherently existent and is habitually affirmed by him to be so. (The latter is the innate conception of inherent existence.) In order for a yogi to work successfully against his conception of inherent existence, it is necessary for him first to cultivate the sense which he has of it so that he is fully aware of it. This implies a willful engagement in the appearance and conception of inherent existence; however, it is only in relation to some other possibility (i.e., nominal existence) that the object of negation can become obvious.

Therefore, sometimes a yogi first cultivates an understanding of nominal existence. Tsong-ka-pa says:[61]

> If you understand the way in which phenomena are established in this system, i.e., merely by power of thought, then you will easily understand the conception which is the opposite of that, the conception of true existence.

The way in which phenomena are established merely through the power of thought is like the way in which a snake is imputed to a rope. Just as there is no snake which can be found among the parts of the rope, or as the collection of the parts of a rope, so with an I which is imputed to the aggregates or a chariot imputed to its parts. Neither the aggregates taken separately, nor the continuum of former and later moments of the aggregates, nor the collection of the aggregates, are to be taken as an example of an I. The I exists merely imputed in dependence on the aggregates of his own continuum.[62]

The fifth Dalai Lama presents an explanation of the way in which the object of negation is to be ascertained in his *Sacred Word of Mañjushri*:[63]

> Sometimes the I seems to be related with the body. Sometimes it seems to be related with the mind. Sometimes it seems to be related with the other individual aggregates (i.e., feelings, discriminations and compositional factors). At the end of the arising of such a variety of appearance, we come to identify an I which exists in its own right, which exists inherently, which from the start is self-established, as if undifferentiated from the mind and body which are (also) mixed like milk and water.

> This is the first essential, the ascertainment of the object which is negated in the theory of selflessness. We should analyze until deep experience of it arises. Having generated such in the mental continuum, we crystallize an identification of the I conceived by the innate conceiver of an I as a self-established (phenomenon). This I has a relation with one's own aggregates like that of water poured into water.

This is the sense that there is an I which is self-established and which is blended with the aggregates which are its bases of imputation. The yogi can identify this feeling when he is accused wrongly of doing some misdeed. Another instance of it is the vivid feeling of an I which comes about when walking in the dark and becoming frightened by bumping into an unknown object. If, at the time he is meditating, the yogi has no vivid sense of an I, he can fabricate one by recalling such incidents where the sense of I was strong.

There is a grosser feeling of substantial existence which is technically called the conception of self-sufficient or substantial existence. The subtle feeling discussed above nurtures this feeling. The conception of self-sufficient or substantial existence is the conception of a self which does not possess a character which accords with the character of the mental and physical aggregates; on this occasion the yogi would feel that he himself is there without depending on the aggregates. This mode of conception can only arise with the person as its object. There is never an innate feeling of a chariot, for instance, which does not depend on the parts of the chariot which are its bases of imputation. The yogi nurtures this feeling of inherent existence both in the actual meditative session and in everyday pursuits until it becomes evident, and even until it seems like the most plausible way for phenomena to exist. Without a strong feeling for this kind of thing-ness of phenomena, there can be no understanding of what it means for phenomena to be without such a quality. The lack of this inherent existence is their emptiness and the cognition of that emptiness is the purpose of this meditation.

2. The Essential of Ascertaining the Pervasion

At this point it is necessary to set up this series of meditations as a logical operation. In the Sevenfold Reasoning there are two logical subjects, a chariot, given as an example, and a person. Actually

any phenomenon can be the subject, but it is normal to start with the person and an example such as a chariot and later apply the reasonings to other phenomena.

Stated in the form of a consequence, the Sevenfold Reasoning becomes:

> Concerning the subject, a person, it follows that it is not inherently existent because it does not exist in any of these seven ways.

'These seven ways' are the seven ways of existence which are analyzed in the third to the ninth essentials. They are *all* ways in which a phenomenon could be seen to be inherently existent.

The pervasion that must be ascertained here is:

> Whatever does not exist in any of these seven ways is necessarily non-inherently existent (i.e., not inherently existent).
>
> This means that any phenomenon which cannot be found to exist in one of these seven ways must not be inherently existent. Put another way, it means that if a phenomenon were inherently existent, it would have to exist in one of these seven ways.

The yogi must ascertain, with conviction, that if there is a phenomenon that exists in the way in which it appears to him to exist, it must exist in one of these seven ways; he *must* be convinced that all possibilities of inherent existence in this context (i.e., looking at the phenomenon imputed and its bases of imputation) are subsumed in these seven options.

It is enough, here, to consider the first two reasonings, that the self is not the same as the aggregates and that the self is not different from the aggregates. If any two phenomena are taken as examples, it can be seen easily that there are but these two options. Either the first is the same phenomenon as the second, or it is different. There is no third possibility. The entire universe can be divided into one particular phenomenon and everything else in the universe.

These two options cover every possibility for inherent existence. Either a chariot is inherently, naturally the same entity as its parts, or it is in itself a different entity from them. Likewise, the self must either be one entity with the mental and physical aggregates or it must be a different entity. There can be no third possibility.

The remaining five aspects of the Sevenfold Reasoning are elaborations on either one or the other of these or both. They are included for the sake of letting the mind become thoroughly imbued with a sense of the unfindability of an inherently existent phenomenon.

The two positions—that the phenomenon imputed is not its bases of imputation and that the phenomenon imputed is not different from its bases of imputation—are sufficient for a logical proof of the thesis that the phenomenon imputed has no inherent existence. However, the innate false view of the transitory collection is not logical; it does not analyze and determine that there is a relationship of sameness or difference.[64] Such an analysis is a function of an ultimate analysis such as the Sevenfold Reasoning. Thus it is said that the seven aspects of the Sevenfold Reasoning are presented with a view towards the mode of operation of the false view of a transitory collection.[65]

3. The Essential of Realizing that the Phenomenon Imputed is not the Same as its Bases of Imputation.

'Phenomenon imputed' and 'bases of imputation' is technical language for, in the example, a chariot and its parts. When an axle, two wheels, a body of a certain shape and so on arranged in a certain way are seen or thought of, immediately an image arises which is all ready to be called 'chariot'. It may be that only some of the parts are necessary for the thought 'chariot', but whatever provides the necessary stimulus is the basis of imputation.

So, in more concrete language, this is the essential of realizing that the chariot is not the same as its parts or that the person is not the same as the mental and physical aggregates which are its bases of imputation. The way to realize this is first to produce the strong feeling that a person and its bases of imputation, the aggregates, are inherently one thing, that a person is there, appearing as if inseparably mixed with the aggregates or with some aggregate or aggregates that seem particularly important. Since this feeling has been cultivated in the first essential, it should come easily now.

Then the yogi thinks that if the person and the aggregates were the same, certain faults would arise. For example, if the person and the aggregates were naturally one entity, it would be absurd to assert a person or self, since person or self would merely be synonyms of aggregates or of one of the aggregates. (Then the yogi might think that this was indeed true, that the self is the mental

consciousness, for instance. In this case he could apply analysis again and ask himself whether mental consciousness is not just a synonym of person. Or, he could ask himself whether the present moment of the mental consciousness is the self, or the next moment, etc. Since there is only one self, there could not be a plurality of moments.)

Moreover, if the person and the aggregates were naturally one entity, then, just as there are many aggregates, there would have to be many selves. The yogi could ask himself which self should eat: should he let some go hungry and just feed one, or should he eat many meals? This may sound ridiculous, but it is necessary to challenge some of the suppositions of ordinary thought just because ordinary thought is so embedded in the conception of inherent existence. If the yogi can find himself a situation in which it would really make a difference to him that there were many persons (in his own continuum) and he sees this as a consequence of the way he views things, this reasoning will have an impact on him and start to break down his sense of the person as being inseparably mixed with the aggregates.

Another technique would be for him mentally to separate his aggregates, or even just the parts of his body, one from another and then visualize each one as being the person, as what he holds to be himself. At some point, if he searches long and hard enough for some unity among these, he will be faced with the inability to find a self like the self that originally appeared to him. At that point he has a cognition of an emptiness of the person's being the same as the aggregates.

Another fault which would arise if the person and the aggregates were naturally the same is that, since the aggregates have the attributes of production and disintegration, the person would have the attributes of production and disintegration also.[66] If this production and disintegration were only nominal (i.e., conventionally existent), there would be no problem. However, if they were production and disintegration which naturally exist, several faults would follow, since production and disintegration of this sort are characterized as being production from something unrelatedly different and a complete cessation. Although the mind does not ordinarily enter into these distinctions, this is not some kind of complicated philosophical definition; it is a consequence of the way that a mind dominated by the apprehension of inherent existence perceives these to be.

If the person had inherently existent production and disintegration, then it would be inherently different from the other persons in its own continuum. Since inherent difference means unrelated difference, the person of this life would then be unrelated to the persons of past lives and future lives. Chandrakīrti says:[67]

> The phenomena which are based on Maitreya and
> Upagupta
> Are different and thus not included within one continuum.
> Whatever are naturally separate
> Are not suitable to be included within one continuum.

Jang-kya mentions three faults that would arise from the unrelated difference of past and future lives in the same continuum: (1) it would be impossible to remember past lives, (2) actions done would be wasted, and (3) one would meet with the results of actions that one had not done.[68]

The remembrance of former lives is commonplace in the philosophical literature of India and Tibet. The ability to recall past lives, moreover, is not limited to Buddhas and advanced Bodhisattvas but is a power that can be attained by any yogi if he applies himself in meditation. Thus, the impossibility of remembering former lives contradicts an experience that is, or can be, common to yogis.

If the person were inherently produced at birth and inherently disintegrated at death then it would be inappropriate to speak of former and later lives in the continuum of that person. For, that person's continuum would only endure for one lifetime. It would follow from this that the predispositions which are the results of actions done would only be effective within the life in which they were produced. Thus, any merit done for the sake of attaining Buddhahood in the future, for example, would be completely destroyed at death and would thus be wasted. Similarly, birth in favorable circumstances, or in one of the hells, or in whatever circumstances obtain, would not be the result of actions done in past lives by a person in the same continuum as the subject.

4. The Essential of Realizing that the Phenomenon Imputed Is Not Inherently Different from its Bases of Imputation

This is the essential of realizing that the person is not a different entity from the aggregates which are its bases of imputation. There is no innate form of the conception of a self which corresponds to this. There is an artificial form of the conception of a self of persons

which conceives its object to be different from its bases of imputation. Further, there is an innate form of the conception of self-sufficient or substantial existence which is similar to this conception: it differs in that it conceives the person as having merely a different character from the aggregates, not as being a different entity from them.

The proper object of negation of the Sevenfold Analysis is the inherent existence of a person. This is the object of negation which is what is non-existent in the theory of selflessness. There is also an existent object of negation of the Sevenfold Reasoning; it is the innate conception of an inherently existent person. It exists because it is a consciousness. The innate conception is necessary in order to have the artificial conception—when it is destroyed, the artificial conception is also destroyed. Conversely, it is a principle of Tsong-ka-pa's that when an analysis is done following the artificial mode of conception of true existence, this analysis serves as a branch of refuting the innate form.[69] The reason is that the artificial forms represent possible forms of the mode of existence of the I and the aggregates if the I inherently existed.

In order to practice the fourth essential (or, in the enumeration of seven aspects, the second aspect), the yogi first generates a strong sense of an inherently existent person; this is the first of the nine essentials, that of ascertaining the object to be negated. Then he clears away any sense of the aggregates in his mind and determines whether or not he has such a feeling of 'I' left over. If the sense of an I persists, he then must decide whether it is sensible to have this feeling or not. In order to do this, he applies the second aspect of the Sevenfold Analysis.

If the person and the aggregates which are his bases of imputation are inherently different, then, since they are also simultaneous, they must be unrelatedly different.[70] For two phenomena to be inextricably related they cannot be both simultaneous and different entities. If a person and the aggregates which are his bases of imputation are unrelatedly different, a number of faults accrue:

1. The person would not have the characteristics of the aggregates in question. Here, characteristics refers to production, cessation and abiding—attributes shared by all impermanent phenomena. In the gross sense of production and cessation this would lead to the absurdity that the person would not be born and would not die.

2. In the subtle sense of production and cessation this would mean that the person would have to be a permanent phenomenon, a non-product. It would then follow that it would not be suitable to impute the person to the aggregates. The person would be changeless, whereas its bases of imputation would be in constant disintegration and change.
3. Furthermore, if the person were inherently different from the aggregates which are his bases of imputation, he would have to be apprehendable separate from them. A self which had a different character from the aggregates would have to be apprehendable without the apprehension of the aggregates just as the aggregates, which all have different characters, can all be apprehended separately. Such a self would not be able to know, experience and so on as the aggregates do or, if it did, its knowledge and the knowledge of the mental aggregates which are its bases of imputation would be unrelated.

The yogi applies this analysis and determines whether or not the conception of a person is appropriate in these circumstances. If he has had a firm experience of the unfindability of a person which is the same as its aggregates, then, if he moves on to this essential and refutes inherent differences, he may be able to realize an emptiness of the person. However, the mind is so thoroughly accustomed to conceiving inherent existence that the yogi would really have to apply himself and will probably have to move on to the other essentials in order to work effectively against the whole spectrum of modes of conception, towards which the false view of a transitory collection has tendencies.

Thus, the remaining five reasonings are for the sake of driving home the meaning of no inherent existence and making it a living fact for the yogi.

5. The Essential of Realizing that the Phenomenon Imputed Is Not Dependent on its Bases of Imputation

This is the third aspect of the Sevenfold Reasoning, that the person is not inherently dependent on the aggregates which are his bases of imputation. Here the simile is used that the self and the aggregates appear to be like a lion in a forest. The aggregates are more extensive than the self which appears to be somewhere within them, but not one of them. This is a branch of the fourth essential, that the self and the aggregates are not different, but with an emphasis

on the aggregates as not being the base of the self. The same reasoning that applies in the fourth essential applies here.

6. The Essential of Realizing that the Phenomenon Imputed Is Not the Support upon which its Bases of Imputation are Dependent

This is a refutation of the sense that the aggregates are dependent on the person. The conception of the person and the aggregates in this case is said to be like a forest in snow, where the aggregates are the forest and the person is the snow pervading the forest and surrounding it. Put another way, the self is like a bowl in which, like yogurt, are the aggregates. Again this is a branch of the fourth essential, this time with the self not being the base of the aggregates. The reasoning effective in that essential can be applied here also.

7. The Essential of Realizing that the Phenomenon Imputed Does Not Possess its Bases of Imputation

There are two ways in which it is possible to possess something. One is like someone possessing a cow, in which case the possession is of a different entity; the other is like someone possessing his own head, in which case the possessor and the thing possessed are the same entity.

If the yogi feels that he possesses *his* aggregates in the manner of someone possessing his own head, then he can ask himself just what it is that is performing the action of possessing. No matter what aggregate or set of aggregates the self is identified as here, they or it will have to possess themselves. For instance, if the self is felt to be the mental consciousness, then, since the mental consciousness is also one of the aggregates, there would be a mental consciousness which, as the self, possesses the mental consciousness—that same particular mental consciousness, no other. That is to say, there would be two mental consciousnesses. (This is tantamount to saying that one person would have two heads; one being the head that he is, the other the head that he possesses.)

This reasoning is also applicable in the third essential, where the object imputed and the bases of imputation are seen to not be the same entity. Likewise, this part of the seventh essential is a branch of the third essential and the reasoning laid out for that essential is also applicable here.

If on the other hand, a person possessed *his* head as if possessing a cow, then it would have to be shown that this person was a

different entity from his head. The reasonings outlined in the explanation of the fourth essential refute this.

8. The Essential of Realizing that the Phenomenon Imputed Is Not the Mere Collection of its Bases of Imputation

The 'mere collection' is just the unarranged collection of all the bases of imputation. For example, to assert that a chariot is the mere collection of its parts would be like saying that a pile of an axle and two wheels and so on would be a chariot and could take you on a journey.

In Prāsaṅgika the collection of the aggregates is the correct basis for the imputation of a person. However, the collection of the aggregates cannot be correctly considered to be either the same as or inherently different from the aggregates. If they were the same, then either (1) just as there are many aggregates there would be many collections, or (2) just as there is only one collection there would be only one aggregate. If they were naturally different, then the collection would have a different character from the aggregates, a position refuted in the fourth essential.[71]

The mere collection cannot be the person because it is incorrect to assert that a phenomenon imputed is the same as its bases of imputation. This is one of the unique features of Prāsaṅgika; in Svātantrika-Mādhyamika, for example, the person is a mental consciousness, i.e., it is its own basis of imputation.

Jang-kya says that this point is difficult to understand. He gives as authority for its veracity a quotation from a Sūtra:[72]

> Just as a chariot is spoken of
> In dependence on its parts,
> So, in dependence on the aggregates,
> There is the convention 'sentient being'.

This is interpreted in Prāsaṅgika as meaning that the person is not the aggregates.[73]

Furthermore, if the person were the mere collection of the aggregates of its own continuum, the fault would follow that agent and object of action would be one. In Buddhist terminology, the aggregates are appropriated at the time of rebirth by the person; the person is their appropriator. The person is said to 'take up' a new collection of aggregates. If the person were the same as the collection of the aggregates, it would follow that the person appropriated himself at the time of rebirth and this is clearly absurd.

This essential is a branch of the third (that the person and the aggregates are not the same) with the reservation that at the time of doing the third essential the yogi would not be considering the collection of aggregates but only the aggregates themselves.

9. The Essential of Realizing that the Phenomenon Imputed Is Not the Shape of its Bases of Imputation

The feeling that someone is identical with his shape is very common. When a certain person walks into the room he is recognized primarily through his physical appearance. Here the yogi has only to think that shape is merely physical, whereas the aggregates are both mental and physical. If the self really were just the shape of the aggregates, then it would not be possible to know anything, and so on. Further, if the person were both the shape of his body and his consciousness, there would be two persons.

The reasonings shown here to illustrate these nine essentials are mainly those which could be used when meditating on the person and the aggregates. Some of the reasonings which refute the inherent existence of a chariot, i.e., which refute the inherent existence of phenomena other than persons, are different. The most obvious example of this is in the case of the ninth essential where the reasoning given, that the bases of imputation include both mind and body, applies only to sentient beings; the bases of imputation of a chariot do not include any non-physical phenomena. In the case of a chariot the reasoning would be that if a chariot were the shape of its parts, then a model of a chariot could be a chariot.

It is not necessary for a yogi to do all the reasonings or to expend the same amount of energy on each. He need only meditate on those essentials which are helpful in getting rid of the modes of wrong conception of the person and the aggregates which are important to him and then, within those, he need meditate only on the arguments that are effective. However, he would have to do at least the first two reasonings, that the self and the aggregates are neither the same nor different, in order to establish the necessary pervasion. It is important for the yogi to spend some time, in the beginning, becoming familiar with the various reasonings. This is why the example of the chariot is given. Sometimes it is easier to see the arguments as they are set up for a simple phenomenon such as this than to work solely with the person.

Then, when fluency is gained with the reasonings and the pervasion has been ascertained, the yogi can ascertain the lack of an

inherently existent self through using the reasonings that are effective for him.

Although it may seem as if the yogi would be repeating arguments to himself forever when he uses the Sevenfold Reasoning, this is not the case. The nine essentials are to be thoroughly practiced until the point comes where the non-existence of a self such as was identified in the first essential is cognized.

The first valid cognition of emptiness that the yogi has is called an inferential cognition of emptiness. Inferential here means that it is a cognition based on realizing the pervasion of certain reasons (the Sevenfold Reasoning) by a certain predicate (non-existence of an inherently existent Self), not one in which the whole logical structure of the meditation has to be kept consciously alive once the inference has been generated. An inferential cognition of a lack of inherent existence can be tested by turning the attention of the mind to some other object; if a cognition of the emptiness of inherent existence of that object is generated without dependence on any further reasoning, then the yogi knows he has a valid cognition of emptiness.

Once the yogi has cognized emptiness by means of the Sevenfold Analysis, he has begun to destroy the false view of a transitory collection which conceives an 'I'. There are no special reasonings which attack the conception of 'mine', Nāgārjuna says:[74]

> When there is no self,
> How could there be mine?

Chandrakīrti says in the *Supplement* (VI: 165ab):[75]

> Because there is no object without an agent,
> There is no mine without a self.

The same analytical consciousness which realizes the emptiness of a person can realize the emptiness of mine merely by turning to it. No new reasons are needed because without an I (an owner), the mine (the owned) is impossible.

When the yogi has cognized and has become thoroughly accustomed to the emptiness of both I and mine, he has destroyed the false view of a transitory collection in both its innate modes. Having done that, he is liberated from cyclic existence. At this point it is only his compassion that keeps the yogi in the world.[76]

Notes

1. E. Gene Smith, *Tibetan Catalog*, p. 23—source for Jang-kya's dates.
2. Jang-kya, *Clear Exposition of the Presentation of Tenets*, pp. 419. 17-420. 9.
3. Chandrakīrti, *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way"*, Dharamsala edition, p. 178. 1-2.
4. Chandrakīrti, *Supplement*, p. 2.9-11 and p.6.4-5.
5. Chandrakīrti, *Commentary on "A Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way'"*, Dharamsala ed., p. 6. 7-8.
6. Ibid, pp. 8. 11-10. 12.
7. Tsong-ka-pa, *Illumination of the Thought*, Dharamsala ed., p. 13. 19-26. Varanasi ed., p. 24. 1-9.
8. Chandrakīrti, *Commentary on "A Supplement"*, Dharamsala ed., p. 10. 4-8 (commentary on *Supplement* I:4ab).
9. Paul Jeffrey Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, see chart on p. 471.
10. Chandrakīrti, *Supplement* I:4b, Dharamsala ed., p. 9. 14-15.
11. Tsong-ka-pa, *Illumination of the Thought*, Dharamsala ed., p. 14. 3-4. Varanasi ed., p. 24.16-17.
12. Tsong-ka-pa, *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path*, 184a. 6-184b. 2.
13. Quoted in Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 689.
14. In the *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* (folio 190a. 3) Tsong-ka-pa indicates that the sevenfold Precepts of Cause and Effect were transmitted in lineage from Atiśa. Sometimes, however, this series of meditations is said to be from Asaṅga, an Indian Buddhist philosopher and yogi of the fourth century A.D.
15. Tsong-ka-pa, *The Three Principal Aspects of the Path*, verse 9.
16. Quoted in Jang-kya, *Presentation of Tenets*, p. 418.12
17. *Supplement*, p.179.15-17.
18. Tsong-ka-pa, *Illumination*, Dharamsala ed., p. 194. 18-25. Varanasi ed., p. 356. 17-357.5.
19. *Supplement* VI:120cd, p.179.16-17. Sanskrit quoted in Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words (Prasannapadā)*: in *Madhyamakaśāstram*, p.145.8-9.

20. *Illumination*, Dharamsala ed., p.195.2-3. Varanasi ed., p.357.10-12.
21. Quoted in Jang-kya, pp.410.19-411.1.
22. For a more extensive list see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, pp.479-480.
23. Tibetan-Sanskrit correspondences for 'mine' are from Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words*, Sanskrit., p. 148. 11ff.; Tibetan (Dharamsala ed.), p.290.2ff.
24. Tibetan-Sanskrit correspondences: ibid.—skt. p.148.11: Tibetan p.290.2-3.
25. *Illumination*, Dharamsala ed., p. 195-4-6. Varanasi ed., p.357.13-15.
26. Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 595.
27. Chandrakīrti, *Clear Words*, Sanskrit p.148.12-14, Tibetan p.290.3-8 (commentary on *Fundamental Text Called "Wisdom"* XVIII:2cd).
28. Tsong-ka-pa, *Ocean of Reasoning*, *Tibetan Tripitaka* (Tokyo/Kyoto, Suzuki Research Foundation, 1955) 6153, Vol. 156, 314a. 6.
29. Nga-wang-ben-den, *Annotations for the "Great Exposition of Tenets"*, *dbU ma* 78b. 8-79b. 7.
30. *Illumination*, Dharamsala ed., p. 77. 12-19. Varanasi ed., p.142.7-17.
31. Chandrakirti, *Commentary on "A Supplement"*, Dharamsala ed., p.8.13ff.
32. Explanation of Geshe Sopa (of Sera Je monastic college) as reported by Jeffrey Hopkins.
33. Tsong-ka-pa, *Ocean of Reasoning*, P6153, Vol. 156, 159a. 8-159b. 2.
34. Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, pp. 853ff.
35. Nga-wang-ben-den, *Annotations*, *dbU ma* 80a.7-80b.3.
36. Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, pp. 596-7; for further discussion on the subject see Hopkins, pp.586-7, 595ff., and pp. 850ff.
37. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*, Chapter 5, p.16, footnote. (Commentary on Kośa V:7).
38. Franklin Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*, p.553.
39. Nāgārjuna, *Precious Garland*, verse 35. Hopkins (transl.), p.22.
40. Ibid, verse 33, p.21
41. *Illumination*, Dharamsala ed., p. 195. 22-23. Varanasi ed., p.358.18-19.
42. Ibid, Dharamsala ed., p.195.19ff. Varanasi ed., p.35.813ff.
43. Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, pp.596-7.
44. Ibid, p.586.

45. Jang-kya, p.416.5-9.
46. Quoted in Jang-kya, p.422.3-6.
47. *Illumination*, Dharamsala ed., p.13.14-15. Varanasi ed., p.23.14-16.
48. Dharamsala ed., p.213.16-19 (commentary on *Supplement* VI:159d); interpolations from Tsong-ka-pa, *Illumination* (Dharamsala ed., p. 218.9-12. Varanasi ed., p. 401. 1-5.
49. Jang-kya, p.435.14-15.
50. *Commentary on "A Supplement"*, Dharamsala ed., p208. 7-11; last interpolation from Tsong-ka-pa, *Illumination* (Dharamsala ed.) p.214.14-15. Varanasi ed., p.394.1.
51. *Illumination*, Dharamsala ed., p.214.11-15. Varanasi ed., p.393.16-394.1.
52. Jang-kya, p.430.4-6
53. *Illumination*, quoted in Nga-wang-ben-den, *Annotations, dbU ma* 84a. 6-7.
54. *Annotations, dbU ma* 84b. 1-4.
55. Jang-kya, p.416.5-9
56. *Supplement* VI:124b, Dharamsala ed., p. 186. 13.
57. *Annotations, dbU ma* 84b. 7-8.
58. *Fundamental Text Called "Wisdom"* XXII:1; Sanskrit p.187.18, Tibetan (Dharamsala ed.)p.361.10-12.
59. Jang-kya, p.430.11-13.
60. Jang-kya, pp.430.16-431.1; Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, p 874.
61. *Illumination*, Dharamsala ed., p.74.11-13. Varanasi ed., pp.136.20—137.4.
62. Ibid, Dharamsala ed., p.75.2-6. Varanasi ed. p.138. 4-10.
63. Quoted in translation in Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, p.862.
64. Jang-kya, p.416.5-8.
65. Ibid, p.430.1-4.
66. Nāgārjuna, *Fundamental Text Called "Wisdom"*, XVIII:lab; Sanskrit p.145.15, Tibetan (Dharamsala ed.) p.285.7-8.
67. *Supplement* VI:61—quoted in Jang kya, p.437.5-7.
68. Jang-kya, p.436.18-20.
69. Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, p.865.
70. Jang-kya, p.432.8ff.
71. Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, p.580.
72. Jang-kya, p.438.10-14.
73. Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, p.580.

74. *Fundamental Text Called "Wisdom"*, XVIII:2ab; Sanskrit p. 147. 18, Tibetan (Dharamsala ed.) p.288.15.
75. *Supplement*, (Dharamsala ed.) p.219.15-16.
76. *Illumination*, Dharamsala ed., p. 221. 10-12. Varanasi ed., p.406.11-14.

Glossary

English	Sanskrit	Tibetan
action	karma	las
accumulation of wisdom	jñānasambhāra	yeshes kyi tshogs
affliction	klesha	nyon mongs
aggregates	skandha	phung po
altruistic mind of enlightenment	bodhichitta	byang chub kyi sems
appearing object	———	snang yul
artificial	parikalpita	kun btags
aspect	ākāra	rnam pa
basis of designation	———	gdags gzhi
basis of imputation	———	gdags gzhi
base which is empty	———	stong gzhi
compassion	karuṇā	snying rje
compositional factors	saṃskāra	'du byed
conception	grāha/grahana	'dzin pa
conception of a self	ātmagrāha	bdag tu 'dzin pa
consequence	prasaṅga	thal ba
conventional existence	saṃvṛtisat	kun rdzob tu yod pa
cyclic existence	saṃsāra	'khor ba
direct perception	pratyakṣha-pramāṇa	mngon sum gyi tshad ma
discrimination	samjñā	'du shes
emptiness	shūnyatā	stong pa nyid
dependent arising	pratītya-samutpāda	rten cing 'brel bar byung ba
existence as a self-sufficient or substantial entity	———	rang rkya thub pa'i rdzas su yod pa
false view of a transitory collection	satkāyadṛṣhṭi	'jig tshogs la lta ba

English	Sanskrit	Tibetan
feelings	vedanā	tshor ba
foundation of the negation	———	bkag gzhi
Great Vehicle	Mahāyāna	theg pa chen po
ground	bhūmi	sa
Hearer	shrāvaka	nyan thos
Highest Yoga	anuttarayoga	rnal 'byor bla na med pa
image	arthasāmānya	don spyi
imaginary	parikalpita	kun btags
inference	anumāna	rjes dpag
inherent existence	svabhāvasiddhi	rang bzhin gyis grub pa
innate	sahaja	lhan skyes
mere-I	———	nga tsam
mine	ātmīya	nga yi ba/bdag gi ba
natural existence	svalakṣhaṇa-siddhi	rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa
nominal existence	vyavahārasat	tha snyad du yod pa
non-dual understanding	———	gnyis med kyi blo
non-existent imaginary	———	mtshan nyid yongs su ched pa'i kun btags
object	viṣhaya ālambana	yul dmigs yul
object of negation	———	dgag bya
object to be negated	———	dgag bya
object of observation	ālambana	dmigs yul
objective existence	———	yul steng nas grub pa
obstructions of the afflictions	kleshāvaraṇa	nyon sgrib
obstructions to liberation	kleshāvaraṇa	nyon sgrib
obstructions to omniscience	jñeyāvaraṇa	shes sgrib
perfection	pāramitā	pha rol tu phyin pa
person	pudgala	gang zag

pervasion	vyāpti	khyab pa
phenomenon	dharma vastu bhāva	chos dngos po/ gzhi dngos po
phenomenon imputed	prajñapta dharma	btags chos
Precepts of Cause and Effect	———	rgyu 'bras man ngag bdun
referent object	———	zhen yul
self	ātman	bdag
self-sufficient or substantial existence	———	rang rkya thub pa'i rdzas su yod pa
Sevenfold Reasoning	———	rnam bdun gyi rigs pa
Solitary Realizer	pratyekabuddha	rang rgyal
stage of completion	sampānnakrama	rdzogs rim
Truth Body	dharmakāya	chos sku
valid cognition	pramāṇa	tshad ma
Vehicle of the Perfections	pāramitāyāna	phar phyin theg pa
Vehicle of the Secret Mantra	guhya mantrayāna	gsang sngags kyi theg pa
wisdom	prajñā	shes rab

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